MLB'S 2027 SEASON: ON A COLLISION COURSE
by John Nielsen
November 18, 2026
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The Luxury Tax vs. a Hard Salary Cap – Owners and Players Are Miles Apart, Neither Side Is Likely to Blink. Are We Witnessing a Train Wreck?
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As MLB’s current Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) approaches its expiration, a sobering reality is beginning to sink in: Baseball may be heading toward its most consequential labor battle in decades. Owners and players appear entrenched in diametrically opposed positions, with little indication that either side is prepared to compromise. The consequences could extend well beyond the negotiating table, putting the start of the 2027 season—and potentially much more—in jeopardy.
When I was born in 1959, baseball was unquestionably the king of professional sports in America. Remarkably, according to Baseball-Reference, the average attendance at an MLB game that year was an incredibly modest 15,539. Over the next three decades, attendance steadily climbed, eventually surpassing 30,000 fans per game in the early 1990s, just before the players' strike and cancellation of the 1994 World Series. All this in the backdrop of the NFL becoming America’s undisputed #1 sport and the NBA right on MLB’s heels as runner-up.
Consider where things stand today. In 2026, MLB averaged 29,589 fans per game—nearly double the figure from the year I was born. Yet that number remains almost 10% below baseball's all-time high of 32,785 per game, set in 2007.
Before the 1994 strike, baseball was thriving. The league had expanded to 28 teams, and attendance had reached a then-record level. The players' strike, which began August 12, 1994, ultimately wiped out the remainder of the season and, for the first time in 90 years, the World Series. Interestingly, average attendance before the shutdown was slightly higher than in 1993. The immediate damage was not reflected in the lead-up to the strike; it came afterward.
The 1995 season did not begin until April 25, and teams that year played an abbreviated 144-game schedule. Average attendance plunged to approximately 25,260 per game—a decline of over 20% from the previous season. The canceled World Series had taken a toll. Fans were angry, disillusioned and, in many cases, simply stayed away.
It took the dramatic catalyst of the Roger Maris-eclipsing 1998 home run chase between Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa to give baseball a powerful jolt of renewed interest and accelerate its recovery. But the damage from the strike had been about more than lost games and revenue. Baseball had broken a bond with its customers, and fans did not immediately forgive either side.
The 1994–95 baseball strike offers a powerful warning for today's owners and players: In the aftermath of a prolonged labor dispute, even when the games return, the fans may not. Baseball eventually recovered, but it took years—and neither side should assume that another lengthy labor stoppage would be followed by an equally forgiving audience.
Attendance tells only part of the story. Today, baseball's biggest revenue streams extend well beyond the ballpark and game day activities. National and local television rights, streaming deals, sponsorships and licensing generate enormous income streams, often dwarfing what teams collect from ticket sales, concessions, parking and merchandise.
That revenue is at the center of the dispute between owners and players. MLB's annual revenues now exceed $13 billion—roughly equal to those of the NBA. Players want their compensation to reflect that growth and the value they bring to the business. Their primary objective will be to increase their share of total revenues, currently estimated to be approximately 46%. At its core, this is a profitability argument, measured through a company's Profit & Loss Statement. Players want a larger piece of the revenue pie; owners want to preserve—and potentially increase—their share. Both sides have an interest in growing the pie, but they fundamentally disagree over how it should be divided. That has been the dynamic through the last two CBA negotiations, with each side jockeying to gain just a little more at the other's expense with a luxury tax system in place to dissuade a few owners from bidding up salaries too high.
Why are the players so determined to preserve the current luxury-tax system? Quite simply, because it protects baseball's free-market salary structure. The Competitive Balance Tax may discourage excessive spending, but it does not prohibit it. A team can exceed the threshold, pay the penalty and continue competing for the best available talent. The New York Mets and the Los Angeles Dodgers are the poster-boys for this approach. The Yankees, Phillies and a few others dabble in it. That freedom creates competition among owners for players' services and, ultimately, drives salaries higher. A hard salary cap would fundamentally change that dynamic by placing an absolute ceiling on what teams can spend. The players' position is that baseball doesn't need to prevent ambitious owners from spending more; it rather needs to encourage reluctant owners to spend more. Their proposed solution is a higher payroll floor, stronger revenue sharing and penalties for teams that fail to invest in their rosters—not a ceiling on what teams can spend and vicariously, what players can earn.
The union's position is not that the luxury-tax system has solved competitive imbalance. It is that competitive imbalance should be addressed by making low-spending teams spend more, not by forcing high-spending teams to spend less.
Clearly, this time, the stakes of these negotiations are different. While, like the players, the owners remain focused on their individual Profit & Loss Statements, they are also pursuing something potentially far more valuable: increasing the overall worth of their franchises. This is a Balance Sheet or wealth (rather than an income) argument, centered on the growth of owners' equity and personal wealth through higher franchise valuations. Tighter payroll controls, more predictable labor costs and improved operating profitability all serve that objective. And this is where the push for a hard salary cap comes into focus. MLB owners want the same kind of cost-control system enjoyed by their counterparts in the NFL, NBA and NHL who’ve seen their franchise valuations skyrocket with the advent of hard cap systems. They believe a hard cap would not only protect annual profitability but also increase franchise valuations across the board—potentially by a substantial amount. That outcome is far from guaranteed, but it is compelling and, quite possibly, the owners' central economic bet.
In other words, owners are not simply fighting to improve their annual bottom lines. They are fighting to increase the long-term value of their individual franchises. A hard salary cap could fundamentally change the economics of owning an MLB team, with potential financial rewards measured in additional billions of dollars that will effectively automatically inure to them and them alone. That helps explain why so many owners appear prepared for a prolonged, bruising labor battle to get one. The 2027 baseball season now hangs in the balance as owners and players engage in a high-stakes game of chicken—with the fans once again caught in the middle.
So, what's going to happen?
Baseball seems headed for a lengthy and potentially bitter labor confrontation, and I would not count on the 2027 season beginning on time. I don't think either side is bluffing. The owners see this CBA negotiation as an opportunity to fundamentally change baseball's economic structure. The players see a hard salary cap as a direct threat to the free-agent market and the earning power they have fought to establish over the past 50 years.
The key is that this is not simply another negotiation over how many percentage points of revenue each side receives. It is a fight over the rules of the economic system itself.
Here's how I see the next three to four months unfolding.
November: Positioning and Posturing
More meetings, more public statements and very little substantive movement on the central issues. The owners' November 3 proposal to delay implementation of the cap until 2028 was a tactical maneuver, not a retreat. The proposed cap remains $258.2 million, with a $180.2 million floor. The union rejected the revised proposal because the fundamental objection remains unchanged.
The owners are trying to demonstrate flexibility without surrendering their primary objective. The players are making it clear that delaying a salary cap does not make it acceptable.
December: The Lockout
The current CBA expires at 11:59 p.m. on December 1. I expect the owners to lock out the players immediately.
Major-league transactions, free-agent signings and communications between clubs and players will be frozen in place. That will bring an abrupt halt to an offseason that is already underway and which may go crazy over the next two weeks. Everyone can then sit back, relax, and enjoy the holiday season, because I don't expect much of anything to get accomplished.
January: A Long Winter of Little Progress
I anticipate considerable public rhetoric but very little progress on the economic issues. The players will not voluntarily agree to a hard cap simply because the owners offer a higher ceiling, a more generous payroll floor, or even greatly increased major league minimum salaries (currently $780k).
The owners, meanwhile, have a strong incentive to maintain pressure. They know that a lockout during the offseason is considerably less damaging to their businesses than a strike during the regular season, when TV and streaming revenues will be at risk.
Expect more posturing from both sides.
February: Opening Spring Training Becomes the First Real Leverage Point
More posturing, at least until the approach of Spring Training begins to change the equation.
This is when the pressure on both sides will intensify, markedly. Players want to report to camp, teams want to prepare for the season, and television networks, sponsors and fans just want baseball.
If negotiations remain deadlocked, the question becomes whether either side is willing to risk delaying Spring Training and, eventually, regular-season games.
I expect more serious negotiations as that deadline approaches, but I would not assume that urgency alone will produce an agreement. In fact, I don't think anything gets done before mid-March at the earliest.
If you've got a timeshare in Florida in February, don't plan on attending any Spring Training games!
March: The Regular Season Is in Jeopardy
If the dispute reaches March without a breakthrough, the possibility of losing regular-season games becomes very real.
In 2022, a 99-day lockout ended with an agreement on March 10, leaving enough time to wrap up free agency, stretch out pitchers, and preserve the full 162-game schedule. The schedule was adjusted, with doubleheaders added and scheduled off days eliminated to make it all work. But that dispute did not involve the same fundamental battle over instituting a salary cap. This time, the divide will be considerably more difficult to bridge.
Resolution: A Zero-Sum Game
A resolution will not come easily because, at its core, this dispute has become a zero-sum game. There is very little middle ground when the two sides are arguing over fundamentally different economic systems.
A zero-sum game is a situation in which one party's gain comes at the direct expense of the other. The total amount available is fixed, so whatever one side gains, the other loses an equivalent amount. When owners and players argue over their respective shares of baseball's existing revenues, the zero-sum dynamic is straightforward. A larger percentage for one side means a smaller percentage for the other.
But this dispute goes well beyond dividing the revenue pie. The owners want to replace the current luxury-tax system with a hard salary cap. The players want to preserve the free-market system that has driven their compensation for five decades. This is a much bigger zero-sum game—a zero-sum game on steroids—with the very structure of baseball's economic system at stake.
My odds of a resolution without losing regular-season games? Just 25%.
I'd put the probability of a delayed start, but with fewer than 12 games ultimately lost, at another 65%. That leaves a 10% chance that the two sides remain so far apart that something considerably more catastrophic results.
The most troubling precedent may be the NHL's 2004–05 labor dispute. Owners and players were locked in a bitter battle over the same fundamental issue now facing MLB: a hard salary cap versus a market-based free agent compensation system. The NHL owners ultimately prevailed, but only after canceling the entire 2004–05 season. Not a single regular-season game was played, and the Stanley Cup was not awarded for the first time since 1919. When hockey returned the following season, it did so under a hard salary cap.
It is a sobering reminder that owners can be willing to sacrifice an entire season to achieve a permanent change in the economics of their sport.
My greatest concern is that, if the owners remain unified, they may be willing to sacrifice a substantial portion of one season to secure a permanent change in baseball's economic structure. And if the players remain unified, they may be willing to lose that same portion of the season rather than surrender the free-market system that has defined their compensation for five decades.
Neither side appears willing to blink. The stakes are enormous, the financial consequences are measured in billions, and the fans have virtually no voice in the outcome.
Irresistible force, meet immovable object.














There's a lot to unpack. As far as I'm concerned, from the owners side, is that like it or not the Players have to acknowledge how much the owners put into their farm systems, scouting. But as the Players are concerned, the owners have to see the fallacy of all the rules that are for their current try at a salary cap. With all the added money that the new TV/streaming deals bring and and the merchandising amount, let's be honest, there needs to be a real salary floor, and every team can really afford it. Teams throwing money at guys just to keep their revenue sharing check coming in is stupid. If the top salary is $300M before an…